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Abstract—The new generations of SRAM-based FPGA 
(Field Programmable Gate Array) devices, built on nanometre 
technology, are the preferred choice for the implementation of 
reconfigurable computing platforms. However, their 
vulnerability to hard and soft errors is a major weakness to 
robust system design based on FPGAs. 
In this paper, a novel Built-In Self-Healing (BISH) 
methodology, based on modular redundancy and on self-
reconfiguration, is proposed. A soft microprocessor core 
implemented in the FPGA is responsible for the management 
and execution of all the BISH procedures. Fault detection and 
diagnosis is followed by repairing actions, taking advantage of 
the self-configuration features. Meanwhile, modular 
redundancy assures that the system still works correctly. This 
approach leads to a robust system design able to assure high 
reliability, availability and data integrity. 
 
Index Terms—Built-In Self-Healing, reconfigurable 
computing, robust system design, reliability 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE incorporation of self-reconfiguration capabilities in 
recent SRAM-based Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs), allied to the inclusion of soft microprocessor 
cores, enabled the development of autonomous configurable 
computing platforms. By mapping compute-intensive 
sections of an application to reconfigurable hardware, these 
platforms tend to exhibit a significant speedup in 
performance over traditional microprocessors. 
These developments were made possible by the 
introduction of Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) 
technologies, which raised substantially the reliability of 
electronic systems, when compared with the previous use of 
discrete components. Hence, the use of fault tolerance 
techniques was confined only to specific applications 
requiring high levels of security or operating on harsh 
environments. The reduction in the size of transistors in 
each new generation of semiconductor technology led to a 
greater integration and to a per unit power reduction, 
enabling chips to grow in size and complexity. 
However, new nanometre scales also brought some 
negative aspects, namely the vulnerability to soft errors, also 
called single-event upsets (SEUs), which are radiation-
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induced transient errors caused by neutrons from cosmic 
rays and alpha particles from packaging material. Until now, 
they used to be a major concern only for space applications. 
But, for designs manufactured at advanced technology 
nodes – such as 90 nm, 65 nm, and downward – system-
level soft errors became an issue also at ground level. They 
are now much more frequent than in previous generations 
[1, 2].  
Soft errors do not physically damage the chip, but the 
values stored in memory cells may be affected, causing 
incorrect data to be transmitted or an improper instruction to 
be retrieved by a processor. This problem has a particular 
impact on the reliability of SRAM-based FPGAs, because 
the structural definition of the functions implemented relies 
on memory cells. The exponential growing on the amount of 
reconfigurable logic available at each new FPGA generation 
implies also a similar increase on the amount of 
configurable memory cells, which makes FPGAs especially 
vulnerable to soft errors. Additionally, the amount of 
embedded memory blocks available for user’s applications 
is also increasing. 
Another negative aspect due to the smaller technological 
scales is the increased threat of electromigration, which may 
result in permanent physical damages to the chip. The 
number of defects related to small manufacturing 
imperfections that are not detected by production testing has 
been growing as scale goes down. These defects are 
especially prone to electromigration phenomena, resulting, 
after large periods of operation, in the emergence of 
permanent faults. 
The recent addition of new features, such as dynamic 
reconfiguration and self-reconfiguration, the two most 
advanced forms of reconfigurability, may help to cope with 
the problems mentioned above, in particular when dealing 
with critical applications that require a high reliability level. 
Dynamic reconfiguration involves the reconfiguration of 
a fraction of the configurable resources, without disturbing 
the operation of those functions that are not modified. This 
feature extends FPGA’s flexibility, enabling multiple 
independent functions from different applications to share 
the same logic resources in the spatial and temporal domain 
[3]. More recently, and via self-reconfiguration [4], it 
became possible for functions currently implemented to 
control the dynamic reconfiguration of other areas of the 
same FPGA. 
The advantages of using dynamic reconfiguration in the 
implementation of online structural test and fault tolerance 
strategies were largely explored in previous works [5-8]. 
However, those previous approaches relied on a rotate and 
test methodology, whose primary aim was the structural test 
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of the FPGA. Moreover, only a small fraction of the 
resources were configured to be tested at a time. These 
solutions create a test latency that must be taken into 
account since it degrades the performance of the test 
strategy. If a defect, caused by a soft error, affects the 
functionality of a given function, the resulting fault will be 
propagated until the test function reaches the defective 
resource. By then, the fault may already have caused the 
irreversible malfunctioning of the whole system, eventually 
interrupting its operation. In some cases, it may be 
impossible to recover from this situation. 
This paper presents a new methodology that aims to 
increase the reliability of configurable computing platforms 
implemented in dynamically reconfigurable FPGAs. The 
drawback associated to previous approaches is avoided by 
the introduction of fault tolerance techniques.  
The next section analyses traditional hardware 
redundancy techniques, and is followed by the presentation 
of the proposed methodology. Several aspects related to its 
practical implementation are then discussed, and future 
research lines are presented in the concluding section. 
 
II. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY 
The reliability of a system is defined as the probability of 
that system to be functioning correctly throughout an 
interval of time, [t0, t], given that it was performing 
correctly at time t0. Traditionally, highly critical 
applications relied on hardware redundancy to increase their 
reliability. 
One of the best know of such approaches is Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR), a static redundancy technique 
that achieves fault tolerance without actually detecting any 
fault. In this method, extra components are used to 
instantaneously mask the effect of a faulty component, 
meaning that no propagation of the fault will occur. The 
concept of TMR was originally suggested by von Newmann 
[9], and is illustrated in figure 1. Each module may be a 
complete system, such as a computer, or a less complex 
unit, like a microprocessor or even an adder or a gate. The 
voting element accepts the outputs from the three sources 
and delivers the majority vote at its output. This concept can 
be extended to any number of redundant modules to 
produce an N-modular redundant (NMR) system, which can 
tolerate up to k module failures, where k=floor[(N-1)/2]. 
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Fig. 1.  Triple Modular Redundancy 
The reliability equation for an NMR system is given by 
[10]: 
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In (1), RM is the reliability of each individual module in 
the NMR system. In this case, it is assumed that the majority 
voter does not fail, which is an unrealistic principle. When 
this assumption is not verified, the reliability of the voter 
element will determine the reliability of the circuit, since it 
will fail if the voter fails. However, the reliability of a voter 
in a redundant system can be improved by replicating this 
element as well, in a scheme that is called N-NMR [10]. 
In new nanometre technology, the use of fault tolerance 
mechanisms is essential, not only due to soft errors, but 
because it is unrealistic to expect that a manufacturing test 
will cover all possible faults. In particular, delay faults 
emerging from defects of resistive type, or due to crosstalk 
or ground bounce, are almost impossible to foresee [11]. 
Hardware redundancy is also a preferred choice to 
improve the reliability of highly critical applications based 
on FPGAs [12-16]. Due to their inherent configurability, 
FPGAs are especially suitable for the implementation of 
modular redundancy, since it does not require any new 
architectural feature and it is function independent. 
But other factors have to be considered, such as common-
-mode failures (CMFs). Despite the introduction of 
hardware redundancy, hardware redundant FPGA-based 
systems may fail because of the emergence of faults that 
affect more than one module of the redundant system at the 
same time, generally due to a common cause. These 
possible systematic defects in specific parts of the 
configurable logic space may eventually also lead to the 
simultaneous failure of more than one module of the same 
function (and consequently of the function itself), if all its 
modules are identical and implemented using equal 
resources [13]. Particularly, in FPGAs, soft errors affecting 
the configuration control mechanism of the device may 
cause the erroneous configuration of several modules, 
depending on the number of data frames affected during its 
partial or total reconfiguration. Another factor to be 
considered is multiple-event upsets caused by a source of 
radiation [17], which may also lead to multiple-module 
failure in a redundant system. 
The use of design diversity, where each redundant 
module is synthesized using a different synthesis technique 
(which leads to different implementations of the same logic 
circuit), may help to prevent the consequences of CMFs, 
further enhancing reliability [16]. Additionally, the use of 
word-wise instead of bit-wise voters further averts the 
occurrence of failures due to CMFs [18].  
Possible soft errors in the on-chip configuration memory 
cells may be recovered by simply performing a partial 
readback operation of the configuration of the faulty 
module. The retrieved bitstream is compared with its 
original configuration, and if a modification is detected, the 
correct bitstream can be re-established through partial 
reconfiguration. This technique is known as scrubbing, and 
defined as the process of re-writing the configuration 
memory during (and without disturbing) normal FPGA 
operation [19]. 
Readback and partial reconfiguration do not affect the 
data stored in flip-flop registers, and consequently soft-
errors in data registers cannot be recovered using this 
method. However, due to the transient nature of upsets, the 
 
 
 
error will be recovered by the circuit when the affected flip-
flop is updated again. The propagation of soft-errors, either 
affecting data registers or the functionality of the circuits, is 
avoided by redundancy. 
If it is clear that hardware redundancy increases the 
reliability of a system, it is also obvious that no single 
solution is able to cope with the whole universe of possible 
identifiable problems and their consequences. Moreover, 
any proposed methodology has also to take into 
consideration the cumulative impact of single errors, as their 
added effect may lead to the quick disruption of a system. 
The great advantage of using reconfigurability is that this 
issue may be solved without a significant rise in costs. In 
fact, in the event of a module failure, a diagnose-and-repair 
mechanism may be activated and the initial redundancy re-
-established. This may be done transparently and without 
human intervention, since physical component replacement 
is not needed. This means that a higher level of 
maintainability1 is achieved, without even implying the 
inoperability of the affected circuit, since it is protected by 
TMR. This is both true to hard and soft errors, despite the 
different repair mechanisms that must be adopted to 
overcome them.  
 
III. A METHODOLOGY TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF 
FPGA-BASED SYSTEMS 
The reliability of a circuit implemented in an FPGA is 
intrinsically connected to the reliability of the component 
itself. Nevertheless, the maintainability of the same circuit is 
higher due to the dynamic and self-reconfiguration features 
of new FPGAs. In a discrete implementation of a TMR 
system, if a defect affects the functionality of one module, 
reliability decreases, but the system still works correctly. A 
second failure in one of the remaining modules may lead to 
a malfunctioning of the system. Ideally, when a module 
fails, it should be replaced to restore the original redundancy 
index. However, this action may not be possible 
immediately. In certain cases, like in space applications, it 
may even be impossible. Besides, it is not easy to detect a 
fault in a TMR implementation using traditional online test 
strategies, due to the inherent masking properties of 
redundancy. 
In our approach we propose the implementation of a 
Built-In Self-Healing (BISH) methodology, which 
comprises built-in self-detection, built-in self-diagnosis and 
built-in self-repair. In an initial stage, this methodology is 
being applied only to soft-errors, but we plan to extend its 
usage to hard errors, making use of active replication 
techniques [3]. The methodology to be followed and several 
of the issues involved are already discussed in this paper. 
The BISH approach can be divided into three tasks: 
detection, diagnosis and repair. These tasks are controlled 
by a soft microprocessor core implemented in the same 
FPGA, and having a compatible reliability index. Due to the 
usual long time interval between module failures [20], a 
generic soft microprocessor core that carries on other tasks 
 
1 The probability that an inoperable system will be restored to an 
operational state in case of failure within the time t. 
related to the operation of the whole system may be used for 
this purpose. 
The detection of faults is done through a scan chain that 
regularly captures the values at the outputs of all the 
modules and voters, including those of the soft 
microprocessor core, as shown in figure 2. Optionally, other 
information may be included. For example, if word-wise 
voters were used, apart from individual bit capture, the error 
signal produced by the word-voter can also be included in 
the scan chain. 
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Fig. 2. Example of a T-TMR implementation with a scan chain 
 
Upsets can also affect the values shifted through the scan 
chain, thus leading to wrong fault diagnosis and 
consequently to the extemporaneous activation of a 
repairing mechanism. However, despite representing an 
additional unnecessary task for the reconfiguration 
mechanism, it does not affect system operation. A more 
complicated situation happens if the structural configuration 
of the scan chain is affected by a fault, either due to a hard 
or soft error. In this case, several neighbouring bits in the 
scan chain will be disturbed, indicating that a simultaneous 
general failure in all modules of one or more functions is 
taking place. If this happens, and since the probability of a 
general failure is very low, the scan chain must be checked 
first. The Boundary Scan (BS) chain may also be used to 
capture each FPGA output [21]. As a hard-wired 
implementation, this scan chain is less prone to soft errors. 
The captured bitstream is shifted to the internal 
microprocessor where it is analyzed. All bits at the outputs 
of the same set of redundant modules and at the outputs of 
their respective voters must be equal. If word-wise voters, 
or any other fault tolerance mechanisms, are used, the error 
signal produced has also to be checked. In the event of error 
detection, a diagnosis phase follows-up.  
Since the scan chain cells completely wrap the modules 
and voters, it is possible to confine the origin of an error to 
the space between them, corresponding to the module or 
voter where the value was captured, and to the 
interconnections in-between [22]. 
Three possible causes for a fault to appear may be 
considered: 
1. the faulty value is due to a soft error affecting one of 
the circuit registers; 
2. the faulty value is due to a soft error affecting a 
configuration memory cell, which may lead to a change in 
the functionality of the module or voter or in the routing of 
signals; 
3. the faulty value is due to a permanent physical defect 
affecting the structure of the FPGA. 
The first case may be immediately excluded if the error is 
captured at the output of a voter, since voters are typically 
 
 
 
implemented using combinational logic only. If it has its 
origin in a module, one can expect that the fault will be 
automatically corrected at the next register update. A new 
scan chain capture operation may show that the error has 
already been fixed and no further action is needed. If not, 
the second situation may have occurred. 
In this case, a background task is launched to readback 
part of the configuration bitstream of the area where the 
affected module is implemented. Comparison with the 
original bitstream may be done by bit comparison or Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC). If an incoherency is found, the 
microprocessor performs a partial reconfiguration of the 
area where the supposedly affected module is implemented, 
restoring the original configuration and eliminating the 
cause of the failure. The output of the module should now 
be captured again and its correctness verified. 
If no error on the configuration bitstream is detected after 
the readback-and-compare operation, but the fault persists, 
the most probable reason is the existence of a physical 
defect in the array. Therefore, in order to restore the 
reliability index, the affected module has to be reconfigured 
in a fault-free area and its input and output connections re-
established. Then, the resources occupied by the faulty 
module are released and subsequently tested to detect and 
diagnosis the origin of the fault [8]. This procedure is 
controlled by the microprocessor. When the defect location 
is identified, the defective resource is “marked down”, to 
avoid its use in future reconfigurations. A list of faulty 
resources is maintained in memory by the microprocessor. 
This memory must also be protected against upsets using 
error checking and correction techniques based on 
Hamming or Hsiao codes [11]. 
The remaining resources that are tested OK can be reused 
in later replacements of any other faulty module. In this 
way, the available spare resources are almost entirely 
restored for future replacements. Figure 3 shows the 
diagram flow of the proposed methodology. 
The detection, repair and test proceedings are controlled 
by the internal microprocessor. To not affect the 
performance of the system, these tasks should be executed 
in background during normal operation exploiting regular 
idle cycles. Meanwhile, the TMR implementation ensures 
the correct operation of the system, and therefore the extra 
overhead time has no critical influence over its operation. 
This methodology extends the reliability of each function 
and enables a smoother degradation of the global reliability 
index. Despite being a static T-TMR implementation, a 
faulty module or voter is dynamically repairable n times, 
where n depends on the cause of the failure. If the origin is 
not a permanent physical defect, then n is infinite. 
Otherwise, n depends on the initial amount of spare 
resources and on the location of the defects that affect the 
structure of the FPGA. 
The microprocessor is also implemented using T-TMR to 
ensure a reliability index compatible with the remaining 
blocks. The microprocessor is divided in small functional 
modules, facilitating replacement in case of fault detection, 
and reducing the spare space needed for replication. If the 
defective module is part of one of the three implemented 
processors, the remaining two will be responsible for the 
replication of the malfunctioning module. Subsequent test 
procedures will already be assumed by the whole three.  
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Fig. 3. Flowchart of the detection-diagnose-and-repair methodology 
proposed 
 
Self-reconfiguration is necessary to embed the whole 
system in a single FPGA, including the BISH features. The 
Virtex-II and Virtex-II Pro families have an Internal 
Configuration Access Port (ICAP) [23]. The ICAP enables a 
soft microprocessor core to control its own dynamic 
reconfiguration or the reconfiguration of any external 
modules, without stopping or disturbing the operation of the 
whole system. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Despite the apparently easy steps necessary to implement 
the proposed BISH methodology, many problems will have 
to be overcome. 
When the system is synthesized, each one of the different 
modules from the various functions is configured in 
contiguous resources so as to enable lower interconnection 
delays and better performance. When a defect is found in an 
area previously occupied by a module, the remaining 
resources of that area may still be used in future 
reconfigurations. However, when a new defective module 
needs to be replicated, the presence of this “defective 
island” may disperse the components of the module, and 
thus lead to a degradation of performance. To avoid this 
effect, a rearrangement of the modules in an area with 
“defective islands” may be necessary [3]. 
Additionally, the spare area where a defective module is 
replicated may be relatively far from its previous location, 
resulting in longer path delays. Despite not leading to an 
erroneous output from the voter that collects the results 
from all the three modules of the function (if the remaining 
two modules still working fine), in practice it reduces 
module redundancy, making fault tolerance ineffective. To 
prevent the perpetuation of this situation, after the test the 
 
 
 
module may return approximately to the same area where it 
was originally located (avoiding the defective resource). 
However, since the area became probably smaller, a 
rearrangement of the contiguous modules may be needed to 
fit in the returning module, without dispersing its 
components by different and possibly distant areas. Another 
possibility, depending on the defect, may be a diverse 
resynthesize of the module, avoiding the defective resource. 
In this way, the previously occupied spare area is almost 
entirely released for future replications of other modules. 
Owing to lack of enough contiguous free resources, this 
procedure avoids the fragmentation of the logic space, 
which would eventually prevent the replication of new 
defective modules. That rearrangement shall be achieved 
without affecting the functionality or disturbing the 
operation of the rearranged functions, by a dynamic 
relocation mechanism [3]. Furthermore, to facilitate this 
process, only one module of each function shall be 
replicated at a time. This step-by-step procedure also avoids 
a rise in the path delays, which would lead to degradation of 
performance, and eventually (as referred above) to a false 
indication of a defective module. 
The initial replication of the module and the possible 
subsequent rearrangement of the functions imply that the 
microprocessor shall be able to manipulate directly the 
FPGA configuration bitstream. This is necessary to create 
partial reconfiguration files for the replication procedures 
and to perform re-routing. To support this feature, a 
software tool is being developed, based on the JBits 
software − a set of Java classes that provide an Application 
Programming Interface (API) to access the Xilinx FPGA 
bitstream [24]. This tool will create the partial configuration 
files and will carry out the partial and dynamic 
reconfiguration of the FPGA through the ICAP interface. 
Consequently, the microprocessor shall be prepared to run 
this software. Two solutions are being considered: the use 
of a generic microprocessor; or the use of a Java processor. 
In the first case, a generic soft processor core will run a Java 
Virtual Machine (Java VM) developed specifically for that 
microprocessor and to support the set of Java classes used 
by the reconfiguration tools. The disadvantage of this 
solution is the amount of memory necessary to hold the 
JAVA VM. 
The second hypothesis, the use of a Java processor, seems 
to be the most adequate solution for the inclusion of the 
BISH feature, since the software necessary to its 
implementation is developed using Java. These will also 
speed up its execution, reducing time latency between 
detection and correction of any fault. The disadvantage of 
this solution is that any other applications concerning the 
operation of the system, not related to the BISH feature, 
have to be rewritten in JAVA, which, in some cases, may 
not be feasible. However, this may not be a problem if a 
new product is being developed from scratch. 
Therefore, the option between the two proposals must 
take into consideration not only the BISH implementation 
but also the purpose of the whole system and the current 
stage of its development cycle. 
Since the partial configuration files that implement the 
rearrangements defined by the repair procedures are 
generated automatically (without designer intervention), the 
inclusion of this methodology is expected to be quite 
straightforward, and completely transparent for the final 
user. Its incorporation at the design level will also be 
automated in a later project phase. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The methodology presented in this paper is at an early 
stage of implementation. Therefore, apart from the 
description of the project and of the consolidated parts of its 
implementation, the proposal presents a set of issues that are 
being studied and must be sorted out to ensure its complete 
success. 
Excluding the already mentioned issues and in spite of 
the generalized idea that TMR makes FPGAs virtually 
immune to hard or soft errors, further research is necessary 
and several issues related to their use in reconfigurable 
systems have yet to be considered: 
• the probability of total failure due to a single-event-
functional-interrupt (SEFI), caused by an upset in the device 
Power-On Reset (POR), which leads to the total clearing of 
the configuration memory and causes the loss of state data; 
• the probability of a fault in a function output due to 
bridging faults between modules; 
• the possibility of a false module or voter failure 
diagnosis caused by defects or upsets affecting the scan 
chain that captures their outputs; 
• the vulnerability of the configuration control 
mechanism, of the ICAP and of the BS infrastructure, to 
defects or upsets; 
• the influence that the position of replicated modules 
has over the effectiveness of fault tolerance features (due to 
a variation on the path delay between modules and voters); 
• the vulnerability of the memory holding the original or 
current configuration file, which must also be protected 
against upsets using error checking and correction 
techniques; 
• the probability of an upset to change the content of the 
memory block holding the microprocessor program, since 
TMR does not obviously offer any protection in case of 
software errors. 
Current work is being done towards the resolution of 
these various issues and their integration into the proposed 
methodology. 
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